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Abstract 
A unique aspect of free movement of capital, one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by the Treaty establishing the European Community, is that it applies not only within the 
European Union, but also to movements of capital between EU member states and non-
EU (or third) countries.  The legal and practical significance of this global extension of 
the EU legal regime is still unclear but recent and pending cases before the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities (“ECJ”)  are now beginning to define its  
principles and limits.  The potential impact is most clearly discernible  in the field of 
direct taxation, where numerous  infringement actions by the Commission and requests 
for preliminary rulings in taxpayer initiated cases are now being litigated.  This article 
examines the cases on dividend taxation in the Court’s  intra-EU case law, and seeks to 
assess how these issues will be resolved in the third country cases now reaching the ECJ. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The implications of the guarantee of free movement of capital in Article 56(1) of the EC 
Treaty
1 for Member States’ tax systems began to emerge only in the mid-1990s.  The 
first decision of the ECJ on the taxation of cross border dividends and free movement of 
capital was decided by the ECJ only seven years ago, in 2000.  There have now been a 
number of rulings on what constitutes, and what justifies, a restriction on free movement 
of capital as it applies to taxation of dividends.  The “third country dimension” of free 
movement of capital in relation to direct taxation first came before the Court in two cases 
decided in 2006, and several more are pending.  The broad question yet to be answered is 
whether there is any substance to the EC Treaty’s guarantee of FMC between EU 
Member States and third countries.  If the prohibition on restrictions on third country 
capital movements has a significant impact on EU Member States’ tax systems, what are 
the implications for the international tax system generally?  Will third countries respond 
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1 Treaty establishing the European Community, consolidated version, 24.12.2002 OJ 2002 C 325/33. in kind, removing discriminatory measures and disincentives to cross-border investment 
in their tax treatment of dividends?  Will the OECD adjust its Model Tax Convention?  
Although it is too early to predict answers to these questions, this article attempts to 
clarify the key issues and possible outcomes through an examination of the ECJ’s case 
law on FMC and direct taxation, focusing specifically on how the Court has developed its 
jurisprudence on cross-border dividends. 
 
A.  Free movement of capital from 1958 to 1993 
 
Although the 1957 Treaty of Rome included free movement of capital among the 
foundational provisions of the European Common Market, this freedom was expressed in 
more ambiguous terms than the other freedoms.
2  The EC Treaty guarantees of free 
movement of goods, services, workers, and enterprise (or right of establishment) were 
recognized as having direct effect at an early stage of the evolution of EU law.  However, 
it was not until 1990, when the third Council directive on the subject, Directive 88/361,
3 
became effective that capital movements were defined for the purposes of EU law, the 
Member States were legally required to eliminate barriers to free movement of capital, 
and individuals and companies could invoke the right to FMC to challenge national tax 
laws in the Member States’ courts, with access to the preliminary ruling process of the 
ECJ.
4
 
The key provisions of Directive 88/361, Articles 1 and 4, were absorbed into the EC 
Treaty by amendments agreed in the Treaty of Maastricht, with effect from January 1 
1994.  The new EC Treaty Articles 73b-d, which are the relevant provisions to the issues 
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  2discussed in this article, were renumbered, without other amendment, as Articles 56-58 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
 
B.  Articles 56-58: introduction to the basic provisions 
 
Article 56(1) reads: 
“Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the 
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third 
countries shall be prohibited.”
5
 
The reference to third countries was added in the process of the transferring the 
substantive rules of Directive 88/361 into the EC Treaty as described above.  In addition, 
the requirement that the capital move between residents (of Member States) was deleted, 
so that it is sufficient that the capital move between Member States, or between a 
Member State and a third country.  Persons who are neither nationals nor residents of an 
EU Member State may thus invoke the FMC guarantee in EU Member State courts.
6
 
The significance of the clear wording of Art. 56, guaranteeing the free movement of 
capital between EU Member States and third countries in the same sentence and 
apparently on an equal basis with intra-EU capital movements cannot be lightly 
dismissed, nor can it be taken as unconditionally extending every aspect of FMC as it 
applies in the EU’s internal market to third countries.   
 
It is common to attempt to illuminate the scope and interpretation of provisions of the EC 
Treaty by examining their object and purpose.  In the case of the third country dimension 
of FMC, this is, unfortunately, not a fruitful exercise.  The objective of extending FMC 
beyond the EU was, apparently, to establish the euro as an international reserve 
                                                 
5 Article 56(2) prohibits restrictions on payments in the same mandatory language.  The implications of the 
prohibition of restrictions on cross border payments are not relevant to the issues discussed in this article. 
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  3currency.
7  Although there is no doubt that the establishment of the single currency and 
the European Central Bank were part of the background motivation, this explanation is 
ultimately unsatisfying, or at least, incomplete.
8    Encouraging the flow of capital 
denominated in euros between the EU and the rest of the world so as to promote the 
euro’s status as a stable store of value for central banks cannot be a complete explanation 
for the text of Art. 56.1, as this goal could have been expressed in a separate provision 
encouraging Member States to remove barriers to FMC with third countries in step with 
and for the purpose of progressing towards EMU.  The addition of the third country 
dimension on an equal footing with and in the same sentence as intra-EU FMC seems to 
have more textual significance than simply expressing a general goal of promotion of the 
global use of the euro in international trade and investment.    It is therefore difficult to 
reconcile the clear words of Art. 56.1 with the reality that, within the EU, the 
Commission and ECJ have attributed a legal substance to FMC that has developed 
without reference to EMU. 
  
There are not many clues to be found in the few expressions of opinion emanating from 
within the ECJ as to the purpose of Article 56.  In her Opinion in Fidium Finanz,
9 
Advocate General Stix-Hackl noted that one of the objectives of the liberalization of 
capital movements was to facilitate the flow of international financial services.   The 
Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Ospelt,
10 recently reiterated by him in Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation
11  is that, while in principle restrictions on both 
intra-EU and third country movements of capital are prohibited by Art. 56(1), the 
analysis of whether a restriction was justified could differ.  This flows, in the Advocate 
General’s view, from the different context of intra-EU FMC as a “constituent element of 
                                                 
7 See Patrick Plansky, Cross-Border Movement of Capital: The Free Movement of Capital and Third-
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  4economic and monetary union” and “the complete unity in terms of movement of money 
and capital” that EMU implies.  In its judgment in  Test Claimants in FII Group 
Litigation
12 the Court did not specifically base the third country dimension of FMC in 
EMU, although it agreed with the Advocate General that the situation within the EU 
might not be comparable to circumstances applicable to movements of capital between 
the EU and third countries, so that what constitutes a restriction in a third country case 
may differ from what constitutes a restriction in intra-EU cases.  The Court also agreed 
that the justifications for a restriction on third country capital movements might differ 
from intra-EU justifications.  This may indicate that the Court intends to approach the 
third country dimension issues as they arise, and with specific reference to factual 
circumstances, rather than applying its purpose-oriented approach to interpretation of the 
EC Treaty when considering whether a measure is necessary for the achievement of the 
single market.   
 
Another indication that the goal of establishing the euro as an international reserve 
currency is secondary in stature in comparison with the creation of a true single market in 
the EU is substantial derogation from Art. 56 permitted by Art. 57.1.  As will be 
discussed below, Art. 57.1 generally allows Member States to retain their existing 
restrictions on direct investment, and particularly on investment amounting to the 
establishment of subsidiaries and branches, between the EU and third countries even 
though this is where one would anticipate the most extensive increase in international 
investment denominated in euros. 
 
In summary, it seems reasonable to view the language of Art. 56 as extending FMC to 
third countries as fully as possible on the same basis as within the EU, but always subject 
to the limitations, in particular, of Article 57, as well as general principles of Community 
law, and any specific factual or legal conditions in a particular case.   
 
C.  Articles 57 and 58:  Limitations on Article 56.1 
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As noted above, Art. 57.1
13  is a standstill or “grandfather” clause permitting Member 
States (and the Community itself) to continue to apply to third countries restrictive 
measures in force at the end of 1993 in four broad categories: direct investment 
(including in real estate), establishment, provision of financial services and admission of 
securities to capital markets.   The ECJ has held that new measures that do not change the 
substance of a pre-1994 measure, or that reduce or eliminate obstacles to FMC are also 
permitted to remain in force by virtue of Art. 57.1.
14  For Member States which acceded 
after December 31, 1993 the grandfathered laws are those which were in existence at the 
date of accession.
15   
 
There has not yet been an ECJ case considering whether a post-1993 Community 
measure is contrary to the Treaty guarantee of FMC with third countries, undoubtedly 
because the Community legislature has not adopted any measures dealing directly with 
FMC and third countries.
16
 
Although this issue has not be addressed by the Court, it seems unlikely that a 
Community measure adopted post-1993 that has the effect of liberalizing capital 
movements within the EU can be said to be restrictive of third country FMC simply 
because it does not also liberalize capital movements with third countries to the same 
extent.  The 2003 amendments to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (described and 
discussed below) which require Member States to remove tax restrictions on cross-border  
                                                 
13 The text of Art. 57.1 provides:  “The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the application 
to third countries of any restrictions which exist on 31 December 1993 under national or Community law 
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14 C-302/97, Konle [1999] ECR I-3099 at para. 52; FII Test Claimants at paras. 190-192.  
15 Pending case C-157/05, Holböck v. Finanzamt Salzburg-Land raises this issue in a third country context 
(Switzerland).  Pending case C-492/04 Lasertec, also a third country case, raises the technical issue of 
whether “existing law” means law that has been enacted by December 31, 1993, or law that is applicable by 
that date. 
16 One might, at the fringes, speculate that the European Community’s accession to the GATS, which 
allows WTO members to maintain restrictions on market access in financial services (and thus restrictions 
on movements of capital in connection with financial services) could amount to a Community measure on 
free movement of capital, and indeed, a “step back”.  
  6dividends within the EU, would be seen as a restriction on capital movements between 
the EU and third countries if the opposite view were accepted. 
 
Article 57.2 sets out the Council’s power to legislate by qualified majority in the same 
broad categories of capital movements with respect to third countries, and requires 
unanimity where the measure “constitutes a step back” in liberalization of capital 
movements.
17   It is unlikely that any significant Council legislation affecting Member 
States’ direct tax treatment of FMC will be adopted now that the EU has 27 Member 
States, as unanimity is required in this area.
18  EU positive harmonization of Member 
States’ direct tax systems is currently proceeding through soft law channels, notably 
through proposals for home state taxation of small and medium sized enterprises 
operating in more than one Member State,
19 and a common consolidated corporate tax 
base for other enterprises.
20  A general strategy for “coordination” (as opposed to 
harmonization) of national direct tax systems was announced at the end of 2006.
21
 
                                                 
17 Art. 57.2 provides: “Whilst endeavouring to achieve the objective of free movement of capital between 
Member States and third countries to the greatest extent possible and without prejudice to the other 
Chapters of this Treaty, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission, adopt measures on the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct 
investment – including investment in real estate – establishment, the provision of financial services or the 
admission of securities to capital markets.  Unanimity shall be required for measures under this paragraph 
which constitute a step back in Community law as regards the liberalization of the movement of capital to 
or from third countries.”  There have been no measures adopted on the basis of this provision. 
18 EC Treaty Art. 94 and 95(2).  Although the amendments to the “Merger Directive” adopted in February 
2005 were proposed before the 2004 enlargement, they were adopted unanimously by all 25 Member 
States, and so can be seen as evidence that positive harmonization may still be possible, even in an EU of 
27 or more Member States.  The Merger Directive is Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the 
common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares 
concerning companies of different Member States [1990] O.J.L. 225/1, amended by Council Directive 
2005/19/EC of 17 February 2005, [2005] O.J. L 58/19 of 4 March 2005. 
19 COM (2005) 702 final, Brussels, 23.12.2005, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, “Tackling the corporation tax 
obstacles of small and medium-sized enterprises in the Internal Market – outline of a possible Home State 
Taxation pilot scheme”. 
20 COM (2006) 157 final, Brussels, 5.4.2006, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, “Implementing the Community 
Lisbon Programme:  Progress to date and next steps toward a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB)”. 
21 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, “Coordinating Member States’ direct tax systems in the Internal Market”, 
COM (2006)823 final, Brussels 19.12.2006.  Two additional Communications, on specific priority areas for 
tax system coordination, were released the same date. 
  7Art. 58 applies to both intra-EU and third country capital movements.  Art. 58.1 provides 
a list of justifications for restrictions
22 that, most significantly for the issues discussed in 
this article, expressly allows Member States to retain their tax laws which distinguish on 
the basis of residence or where capital is invested.  It might have been anticipated that the 
international taxation norm
23 that forbids discrimination based on nationality, and 
generally allows discrimination based on residence, would be adopted in the EU legal 
analysis of permissible restrictions on cross-border capital movements.  However, the 
ECJ has ruled that Art. 58 must, as an exception to a fundamental freedom, be strictly 
interpreted.
24  While acknowledging that in relation to direct taxation, residents and non-
residents are not generally in comparable situations, the ECJ has required Member States, 
in order to justify a restrictive tax measure, to demonstrate that, in a given case and in 
relation to the effects of a particular tax measure, the situation of a non-resident is not 
objectively comparable to that of a resident.
25  The so-called “Schumacker principle” was 
applied in respect of distinctions based on where capital is invested in Verkooijen
26 and 
more clearly restated in subsequent cases.  The ECJ has also allowed Member States to 
put forward “overriding reasons in the general interest”, that is, other bases not expressly 
set out in the EC Treaty, to justify a direct tax restriction on FMC, but has not often 
accepted such justifications, and has added no new bases of justification in the context of 
                                                 
22 Art.58.1 provides: “The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the right of Member 
States: a. to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not 
in the same situation with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is 
invested; b. to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in 
particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down 
procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical 
information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security. 
2. The provisions of this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions on the right 
of establishment which are compatible with this Treaty. 
3. The measures and procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in Article 
56. 
23 The OECD Model Convention on Income and Capital, Article 24 Non-Discrimination provides in 
paragraph 1: “Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subject in the other Contracting State to any 
taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and 
connected requirements to which nationals of that other State in the same circumstances, in particular with 
respect to residence, are or may be subjected.”  This wording has been taken to permit Contracting States 
to discriminate on the basis of residence. 
24 Eglise de Scientologie Case C-54/99 [2000] ECR I-1335 14 March 2000 at para. 17, as to the 
justifications on grounds of public policy or security in 58.1b.  This was confirmed to apply also in relation 
to 58.1a in Case C-315/02, Lenz, [2004] ECR I-7063, 15 July 2004 at para. 26. 
25 C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, 14 February 1995.] 
26 Case C-35/98 [2000] ECR I-4071, 6 June 2000, at para. 43. 
  8FMC.  Thus Art. 58 has not in practice extended the justifications available to Member 
States in cases where direct taxation and FMC interface. 
 
II.  THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 56  
 
A.  The definition of “movements of capital” 
 
Although Directive 88/361 is no longer technically in force, it is settled law that the 
“nomenclature” in Annex I of the Directive, listing the transactions and activities which 
are to be regarded as movements of capital, is still the most important and authoritative 
reference.
27   The ECJ also frequently reiterates that the list in Annex I is non-exhaustive, 
signaling that it is willing to consider other transactions and activities as constituting 
movements of capital. 
 
The intra-EU FMC cases not related to direct taxation can be placed (with a few 
exceptions) into two dominant categories:  (a) challenges to laws requiring prior official 
authorization for certain transactions or activities such as the export of currency,
28 the 
purchase of land by non-residents or non-nationals
29  or investment in the host country 
generally;
30 and (b) “golden share” cases.
31  Outside of these two categories, there are  
cases in which national measures providing preferential treatment for interest or 
guarantee fees in respect of loans from lenders established in the particular Member State 
were successfully challenged.
32  A requirement that charges on land be denominated in 
                                                 
27 Case C-22/97 Trummer and Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661 paras. 20-21. 
28 Bordessa, note ___, Sanz de Lera note _____. 
29 These cases include Ospelt (note ___ above); Konle (note ___ above); Reisch Joined cases C-515/99, C-
519-524/99 and C-526-40/49 March 5, 2002 [2002] ECR I-2157; Albore Case C-423/98 13 July 2000 
[2000] ECR I-5965; Burtscher Case C-213/04 12 January 2005 [2005] ECR I-10309; Salzmann Case C-
300/01 15 May 2003 [2003] ECR I-4899. 
30 Eglise de Scientologie, note ___ above. 
31 The golden share usually confers on the Member State government special powers of management or 
control over formerly State-owned or allegedly strategic companies or sectors, but this category also refers 
to cases where legislative measures restrict investment above a certain level in a company or sector. 
32 C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson [1995] FCR I-3955 14 November 1998 and EFTA Case E-1/00, 
State Debt Management Agency v. Íslandsbankí-FBA, 14 July 2000.  The EFTA Court plays essentially the 
same role as the ECJ in enforcement of the fundamental freedoms throughout the European Economic 
Area. See the discussion below regarding the Fokus Bank case decided by the EFTA Court. 
  9the national currency or gold to be registered (and thus enforceable) was also held to be a 
restriction of FMC.
33
 
The interaction of FMC with Member States’ direct taxation systems has already yielded 
more cases than all the non-tax cases combined.  There are cases on interest taxation, 
capital gains, wealth and inheritance taxes and charitable donations and there are many 
more pending.  The earliest cases were primarily concerned with differential taxation by a 
Member State of domestic and foreign dividends received by individuals.  More recently, 
taxation by a source state of outbound dividends has been the subject of legal challenge.   
  
B. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
 
Dividends received by corporations have not been the subject of litigation to the same 
extent as those received by individuals, due to the adoption in 1990 of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive
34 harmonizing (to a degree) the taxation of dividends paid from a 
subsidiary company in one Member State to a parent company another Member State.  In 
the original version in force from 1992 to 2004, a “parent” company had to hold at least 
25% of the capital of a “subsidiary”.  The minimum level of ownership is reduced to 20% 
on January 1, 2005, to 15% as of January 1 2007, and will be further reduced to 10% as 
of January 1, 2009, by amendments adopted in 2003.   
 
The Directive requires EU Member States to eliminate withholding taxes on outbound 
dividends paid to a parent company, so that economic double taxation of company profits 
of the subsidiary by the subsidiary’s home state, and juridical double taxation of the 
dividends by the two states, are abolished.  The Directive requires the parent company’s 
state of residence to either refrain from taxing dividends received from subsidiaries 
(exemption method), or provide a tax credit which reduces the parent company’s 
                                                 
33 Trummer and Mayer, note ____. 
34 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case 
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, [1990] O.J. L. 225/6 (Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive), amended by Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 amending Directive 
90/435/EEC on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries 
of different Member States, [2003] O.J. L. 007/41.
  10corporate tax liability by the subsidiary’s corporate tax paid in its home state in respect of 
such dividends.  From 2005, the Directive also requires Member States to provide a credit 
to the parent company for any lower tier subsidiary’s corporate tax paid in another 
Member State.  Economic double taxation of the subsidiary’s corporate profits by the 
parent’s home state is thus also eliminated.    
 
Although in the form of an EC legislative act, the Directive operates multilaterally  to 
prevent double taxation in the same manner as, though more fully than, the international 
tax system based on the network of  bilateral double taxation conventions (or “tax 
treaties”) concluded between Member States (and between many Member States and 
third countries).  Each Member State, including those which joined the EU after adoption 
of the Directive, must bring its laws into conformity with its provisions, and taxpayers 
may directly enforce the Directive in the national courts of the Member States in any case 
where a Member State has failed to properly transpose the Directive’s provisions into 
national law. 
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive did not completely eliminate the possibility of 
intercorporate dividend taxation being found contrary to FMC.  A recent ECJ ruling
35 
may have revealed gaps in the Directive which are incompatible with FMC, and the 
Court has also recently commented on Member States’ obligations to conform with 
Community law even where the Directive is not applicable.
36   
 
C.  Inbound Dividends 
 
The Verkooijen case
37 can be seen as the beginning of the recent flood of cases on direct 
taxation and FMC, as it was the first direct tax ruling specifically and solely on this 
freedom, rather than as an alternative or secondary ground to services, workers or, most 
commonly, establishment.  Verkooijen resolved a number of significant issues, but 
                                                 
35 Denkavit Internationaal, C-170/05, 14 December 2006. 
36 FII Test Claimants, note ____. 
37C-35/98 cited at note ___.  There were earlier direct tax cases in which FMC was raised as a basis of 
incompatibility, including Bachmann and Svensson and Gustavsson, Safir and Baars, but the judgments in 
these cases emphasize or are based on compatibility with other fundamental freedoms. 
  11unfortunately the judgment is somewhat confusingly written.  The facts predated the 
coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht amendments to FMC, and the case 
therefore fell to be decided under old Art. 67 and Directive 88/361.   
 
Mr. Verkooijen was a resident of the Netherlands, and received dividends on shares he 
held in Petrofina NV, the Belgian parent company of his employer, Fina Nederland BV.  
He was denied a tax exemption for the dividends he received on these shares in 1991.  
Dividends up to 1000 NLG per individual and 2000 NLG per married couple were 
exempt if received from a Netherlands company.   
  
The first ruling of note (at paras. 27-30) was that the cross-border payment and receipt of 
dividends was governed by Directive 88/361.  Although not expressly mentioned in the 
nomenclature of capital movements in Annex I of the Directive, the receipt of dividends 
“presupposes participation in new or existing undertakings” which does appear in the  
Annex.  Further, since the company paying the dividends was resident in another 
Member State and its shares were quoted on the stock exchange, the receipt of the 
dividends could be linked to the “acquisition … of foreign securities dealt in on a stock 
exchange”, and was thus “indissociable from a capital movement”. 
 
Looking at the legislative history of the Netherlands tax exemption for dividends received 
by individuals from Netherlands companies, the ECJ noted that the exemption was 
designed to promote investment in domestic companies (as well as to reduce the 
economic double taxation of company profits in the hands of the distributing company 
and again when received by an individual as a dividend).  It had the dual restrictive effect 
of dissuading Netherlands residents from investing capital in companies resident in other 
Member States, and making it more difficult for companies resident in other Member 
States to raise capital in the Netherlands. 
 
The principle position of the Netherlands government in defending its tax law was that 
the difference in treatment of Netherlands taxpayers’ investments in shares of 
Netherlands companies and investments in foreign companies, was not a prohibited 
  12restriction (or discriminatory) because the situations were not comparable, applying the 
test in Schumacker.
38  The Court seemed to accept that the Schumacker principle can be 
applied when the distinction pertains to where capital is invested, but analyzed the 
justifications by reference to the case law on what constitutes “an overriding reason in the 
general interest”, without making a clear finding as to whether the situations were in fact 
comparable. 
    
The Court rejected the position (advanced by the UK government) that the measure could 
be justified by its objective of promoting the national economy, since “according to 
settled case-law” purely economic objectives cannot constitute justifications for 
restrictions of fundamental freedoms.
39  The Netherlands, supported by several other 
Member States, argued that the partial exemption for domestic dividends mitigated the 
double taxation resulting from the “classical” system
40 of dividend taxation in the 
Netherlands.  Since only Netherlands companies were taxed on their profits in the 
Netherlands, only dividends paid by Netherlands companies suffer economic double 
taxation in the Netherlands.  If the Netherlands exempted dividends from non-resident 
companies as well, it would be granting a complete exemption to the share of such 
companies’ profits received by Netherlands residents, while Netherlands companies had 
already been taxed by the Netherlands on their profits.   
 
The Court did not directly address the argument based on prevention of domestic 
economic double taxation.  It rejected all the justifications put forward, referring 
expressly to a number of its previous rulings in the context of direct taxation and 
restrictions on services, establishment and workers that concerned the underlying policy 
motivations for not extending the partial exemption to inbound dividends.  Loss of tax 
revenue (or erosion of the tax base) has never been accepted as a justification for a 
                                                 
38 See discussion above, notes ___. [25,26, p.8] 
39 Para. 48. 
40 In a classical system company profits are fully taxed, and dividends received by individual shareholders 
are also fully included in income and taxed at the recipient’s  normal marginal rate.  Most OECD countries 
use a form of credit or exemption system for dividends to mitigate or eliminate such economic double 
taxation. 
  13measure that restricts a fundamental freedom
41 (and was accordingly rejected in 
Verkooijen). Similarly, a Member State may not impose heavier taxation on foreign 
source income on the grounds that such income benefits from tax advantages in the 
Member State of source which compensate for the heavier tax in the state of residence.
42  
The “cohesion of the tax system” justification
43 was rejected since there was no direct 
link between the taxation of company profits in other Member States, and the tax relief 
granted (or denied) to an individual Netherlands resident receiving dividends from such 
companies.  A direct link exists only where the tax measures involve a balancing of a tax 
advantage available to a taxpayer with a tax charge applicable to the same taxpayer. 
  
Verkooijen made clear that domestic taxation of dividends received by individuals is in 
principle covered by FMC.  It also confirmed that Art. 58 does not generally allow 
measures which discriminate or restrict FMC on the basis of residence or the place where 
one’s capital is invested.  Verkooijen has been followed in a number of cases challenging 
dividend taxation measures applicable to individual shareholders in Austria, Finland, 
Germany,
44 and the UK.  
 
In Lenz,
45 national tax laws according to which Austria taxed incoming dividends 
received by an individual Austrian resident at the taxpayer’s normal marginal tax rate up 
to a maximum of 50% were challenged.  A fixed flat rate of 25% was applied to domestic 
dividends, and the taxpayer would then not include the dividends in computing her 
aggregate taxable income.  The recipient could choose to include the dividends in 
                                                 
41 Para. 59 Case C-264/96 ICI v. Colmer [1998] ECR I-4695 16 July 1998. 
42 Case C- 294/97 Eurowings Luftverkehrs [1999] ECR I-7467 
43 This justification was accepted in the early case of Bachmann v. Belgium, C-204/90 [1992] ECR I-249 
(28 January 1992).  A measure which allowed a tax deduction for contributions to a pension provider 
established in Belgium but not to pension providers not established in Belgium was necessary to preserve 
cohesion of the Belgian tax system, because the measure concerned one and the same taxpayer, and the tax 
relief for the pension contribution was directly linked to the taxation of the pension benefits receivable in 
the future.  This justification is almost invariably raised, and almost as invariably rejected.   
44 Case C-292/04 Meilicke, March 6, 2007 (Grand Chamber). The German tax credit for domestic dividends 
held to be incompatible with Art. 56 in this case was similar to that in Manninen, discussed below. 
45 C-315/02, Lenz, [2004] ECR I-7063, 15 July 2004. In Case C-242/03 Weidert-Paulus (decided the same 
day as Lenz ) [2004] ECR I –7379 the issue was similar to the inbound dividend cases.  Luxembourg 
taxpayers were allowed a deduction for the acquisition price of Luxembourg company shares but not for 
shares of companies of other Member States.  Not surprisingly, this also was incompatible with Art. 56. 
  14income, but the dividends would then be subject to tax at one half the average rate 
applied to the taxpayer’s aggregate income. 
 
The Court had no difficulty in finding the Austrian dividend tax measures constituted a 
restriction on FMC.  Restating its ruling in Verkooijen unequivocally, it held that Art. 
58.1 was to be strictly construed.  A difference in treatment had to be based on situations 
which were distinguishable on objective and relevant grounds, or which could be justified 
by overriding reasons in the general interest and were necessary and proportionate to the 
objective of the legislation (see para. 27). 
 
The Court found that there was no objective difference between Austrian taxpayers 
receiving dividends from companies in other Member States and those who received 
dividends from Austrian companies.  The profits of both Austrian and foreign companies 
were subject to corporation tax.  The preservation of coherence of the Austrian tax 
system did not justify the different treatment, as there was no direct link between a tax 
advantage made available and a tax charge imposed with respect to one and the same 
taxpayer.  An economic link between the corporate tax paid by an Austrian company and 
the tax advantage provided to Austrian shareholders of Austrian companies in respect of 
dividends (i.e. double economic taxation of company profits by Austria) did not meet the 
strict criteria necessary to invoke cohesion of the tax system as a justification. In any 
event, the Austrian tax advantage allowed to the individual was not dependent upon the 
Austrian company having actually paid corporate tax on the profits distributed as a 
dividend. 
 
Manninen
46 concerned a third type of tax advantage available to Finnish taxpayers in 
respect of domestic, but not inbound dividends.  A domestic dividend entitled the 
shareholder to a tax credit of 29/71 of the amount of the dividend, which fully offset the 
tax of 29% paid by the Finnish company on its profits.  No such credit was available on 
dividends received by a Finnish taxpayer in respect of the underlying corporate tax paid 
by a foreign company although a tax credit offset the withholding tax levied by the 
                                                 
46 C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477, 7 September 2004 (Grand Chamber). 
  15company’s home country (in Manninen’s case, Sweden) on the dividend.  Thus juridical 
double taxation of Mr. Manninen’s dividend by Sweden and Finland was prevented, but 
not economic double taxation of the Swedish company’s profits (by Sweden) and the 
shareholder’s dividends (by Finland).  In an even more conclusive judgment, the ECJ 
found that the Finnish tax measures were an unjustified restriction on FMC. 
 
FII Test Claimants is the first inbound dividends case to apply FMC to third countries; it 
is also the most complicated and the longest direct tax judgment ever given by the ECJ.
47  
The case concerned the advance corporation tax (“ACT”) and franked investment income 
(“FII”) dividend tax system utilized in the UK from 1973 (1994 in the case of the foreign 
investment dividend or “FID” system) to 1999.   Although this system was particularly 
complex and idiosyncratic and is no longer in force, the judgment issued December 12, 
2006 contains some very important rulings of principle in respect of FMC, inbound 
dividends, and third countries. 
 
The FII Test Claimants case is essentially a class action (or “group litigation”) suit in the 
UK national courts, with the ECJ having provided a response to a reference for a ruling 
on a preliminary question on a number of test cases selected from the larger group of 
claimants.  It is the only inbound dividends case concerning dividends received by 
corporations so far, largely because ACT was excluded from the provisions the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, since it is not a withholding tax on dividends, but a method of 
imposing corporate profits tax. 
 
Without going into all the details of the ACT system, UK resident companies had to pay 
ACT when they distributed profits as dividends, but could set off the ACT against their 
corporate profits tax for the year of the distribution, or carry it forward or back to years 
when it had sufficient “mainstream” corporate tax liability to absorb the ACT.  A UK 
resident company receiving dividends from another UK company was exempt from tax 
on such dividends.  In addition, the recipient company was entitled to a tax credit of its 
                                                 
47 Pasquale Pistone, “Expected and Unexpected Developments of European Integration in the field of 
Direct Taxation,” 2007 Intertax, Vol. 35 Issue 2, pp. 1-5 (editorial). 
  16share of the ACT paid by the distributing company on the dividends,
48 and when the 
recipient company subsequently paid a dividend, it could set off the ACT tax credit 
against ACT payable by it on the subsequent distribution.  An individual UK resident 
shareholder receiving a dividend from a UK company was similarly entitled to a 
refundable tax credit against personal income tax in the amount of the fraction of ACT 
liability of the distributing company attributable to the dividend received. 
 
UK companies receiving dividends from non-resident companies were not exempt from 
corporation tax on such dividends, and the dividends did not carry with them an ACT 
credit (since no ACT was paid in respect of such dividends) or qualify as FII.  A tax 
credit was provided to offset withholding tax imposed by the distributing company’s 
home state, either under UK domestic law or a relevant tax treaty.   If the UK recipient 
controlled or held 10% or more of the voting rights in the foreign distributing company, 
tax credit relief extended to the underlying foreign corporation tax on the profits out of 
which the dividends were paid. 
 
The test claimants, all UK resident members of the BAT (British American Tobacco) 
group of companies, challenged the different treatment of domestic and inbound 
dividends as incompatible with both freedom of establishment and FMC on various 
grounds.  At least one of the test claimants received dividends from a subsidiary resident 
in a third country.  The Court ruled that, since all the test cases involved situations where 
the foreign distributing company was controlled by the UK resident recipient company, 
these cases were governed by freedom of establishment.  However, since the facts of all 
the cases in the class action were not disclosed to the ECJ in connection with the test 
reference, the Court ruled that in any case where the UK company did not control the 
foreign company, the case fell under Art. 56 (at para. 38). The Court essentially held that 
the principles of establishment and FMC could be applied on the same basis, depending 
on the degree of ownership of shares in the foreign company. 
 
                                                 
48 The dividend and tax credit together constituted franked investment income or “FII”. 
  17The Court did not consider that the combination of an exemption system for domestic 
dividends and the use of an imputation or tax credit system with respect to foreign source 
dividends was necessarily contrary to Community law, and pointed out that the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive left to Member States the choice between an exemption and a credit 
system for providing tax relief for inbound dividends, as does the OECD Model Treaty in 
Articles 23A and 23B.  However, the Member States must comply with Community law 
on free movement when designing their systems for preventing economic double taxation 
(para. 42-49).  This means, following Lenz and Manninen, that inbound dividends may 
not entail less favourable tax consequences than domestic dividends, and that in 
exercising their discretion under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Member States must 
comply with the requirements of freedom of establishment and free movement of capital.  
Accordingly, the tax credit provided to the UK company must be at least equal to the tax 
paid in the source State, up to the limit of the recipient’s UK tax liability in respect of the 
dividends. 
 
In the case of dividends received by a UK company from a foreign company of which the 
UK company held at least 10% of the voting rights, the UK government claimed that it 
would be only in extremely rare circumstances that the foreign source dividends would 
bear a higher tax burden than domestic dividends, as the tax credit system compensated 
for both foreign  withholding tax and foreign underlying corporate tax.  The ECJ referred 
the actual determination of whether the tax imposed on inbound and domestic dividends 
were equivalent back to the national court. 
 
In cases where the UK company held less than 10% of the voting rights, the tax credit 
compensated only for the withholding tax imposed by the source country, and not for the 
underlying corporate tax paid by the foreign company in its home state.  This eliminates  
juridical double taxation of the dividends, but not economic double taxation of the 
corporate profits, so that foreign dividends were taxed more heavily overall than 
domestic dividends.  The Court found that this difference in treatment discouraged UK 
companies from investing in companies in other Member States and the latter companies 
from raising capital in the UK, and thus constituted a restriction on FMC.   
  18 
The UK government sought to justify the difference in treatment by citing the practical 
difficulties in determining the underlying corporate tax paid by a corporation in which the 
UK company holds less than 10% for purposes of calculating a compensating tax credit.  
It noted that the 10% threshold was more generous than the level prescribed by the 
OECD Model Convention and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, at least in its original 
version (and equal to the final level in the Directive of 10%, effective as of 2009).  The 
court responded that where a Member State exempted domestic dividends received by 
UK resident companies so as to ensure that profits were taxed only once, and where the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive did not apply, a Member State could not subject foreign 
dividends to taxation without providing relief for double economic taxation of the 
underlying profits.  A Member State had discretion in how to ensure it met these 
requirements, and could not set up practical difficulties to justify a system that infringed a 
fundamental freedom. 
 
The next issue was whether the cash flow disadvantage imposed on UK companies, 
which, having received dividends from foreign companies (on which no ACT had been 
paid), then paid dividends to their own resident shareholders, compared to UK companies 
who received only domestic dividends and thus could set off ACT paid by the first 
distributing (UK) company on such dividends in calculating their own ACT liability, 
when they subsequently made a distribution.  UK companies making subsequent 
distributions after having received dividends from foreign companies had to pay the full 
amount of ACT in respect of such subsequent distribution at the time of the distribution, 
and claim a refund of the excess ACT at the time of filing their corporation tax return.  
(This is because ACT is really just an advance payment of corporate tax.)  The Court had 
earlier held in the Metallgesellschaft et al. case
49 that this cash flow disadvantage 
amounts to a restriction on establishment.  It amounts to a restriction on FMC in cases 
where the shareholding does not amount to control. 
 
                                                 
49 Joined Cases C-397/98 and 410/98 [2001] ECR I-1727. 
  19The subsequent issues concerned the compatibility with Art. 56 of the FID regime 
introduced as of July 1 1994.  The FID regime was intended to mitigate the problem 
faced by UK companies receiving large dividends from foreign companies, that it became 
difficult to utilize excess ACT against mainstream corporate tax when dividends were in 
turn paid to their own shareholders.  The FID regime allowed a UK company to elect to 
treat a dividend paid to its own shareholders as a “foreign income dividend”.  ACT was 
payable on FIDs, but if the FID could be matched to foreign profits (received from 
foreign subsidiaries) a refund of the surplus ACT would be paid at the time mainstream 
corporate tax of the UK distributing company became payable. 
 
Again, the cash flow disadvantage to the UK company paying a FID of having to wait 
between 8 ½ and 17 ½ months for a refund of ACT on the dividend (i.e. from the time the 
dividend was paid and ACT was due, to the time the corporation tax return was filed) in 
comparison with UK companies not having to pay ACT at all when paying dividends 
which were not composed of previously received inbound dividends, amounted to less 
favourable treatment.  Further, an individual shareholder of the UK company paying the 
FID would not receive a refundable tax credit in respect of the FID as would a UK 
shareholder receiving an ordinary dividend, and would instead receive different, but less 
advantageous, tax relief.  Both of these disadvantages were held to be restrictions on 
freedom of establishment, or FMC, depending on whether the UK company controlled 
the foreign distributing company. The fact that the FID treatment was optional did not 
change the conclusion that it was incompatible with the Treaty (para. 161). 
 
The Court next considered the legality of the FID regime where the inbound dividends 
came from third countries.  It held that compatibility with Art. 56 was to be assessed on 
the same basis as within the EU:  if the difference in treatment of domestic and inbound 
dividends has the effect of  discouraging UK companies from investing in companies in 
third countries, and the latter from raising capital in the UK, it will amount to a restriction 
of FMC.  To justify the measure it must be shown that the situation of UK companies 
receiving domestic dividends is not objectively comparable to UK companies receiving 
  20dividends from third countries, or that the measure is necessary and proportional to an 
overriding general interest. 
 
The UK government claimed that it could be more difficult to determine the tax paid by 
third country companies than it was with respect to companies resident in the EU.  The 
Court agreed that due to the degree of legal integration within the Community, and 
especially the Directive on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters,
50 the circumstances 
concerning taxation of cross-border capital flows within the EU might not be comparable 
to the situation with respect to a non-EU country.  At least in the abstract, the Court 
agreed with the Advocate General that there may be other justifications for restrictions of 
FMC in the third country context which are not acceptable within the EU.  However, the 
only justification put forward by the UK government was the greater difficulty of 
determining how much tax was paid by the foreign company in its home state, and this 
only to justify the time lag between the time when ACT had to be accounted for in 
respect of foreign dividends, and when it was refunded.   The Court applied a 
proportionality type of approach to find that legislation which refuses completely to take 
into account foreign corporate tax paid abroad in determining the amount of ACT due at 
the time a dividend is paid, while automatically deducting ACT, which is the UK 
equivalent tax on underlying profits of a UK resident company, cannot be justified.  The 
final tax liability on the UK company paying domestic dividends to another UK company 
is not determined at the time the recipient receives the ACT credit which is automatically 
deducted when it in turn pays a dividend, so the argument that it is too difficult to provide 
any relief in respect of the underlying foreign tax on the profits out of which inbound 
dividends are paid is not tenable (paras. 156 and 172). 
 
The final issue of relevance here was the effect of Art. 57.  The basic ACT system had 
been in place since 1973, but the FID rules dated from after December 31, 1993.  In this 
context, the Court stated that the term “direct investment” in Art. 57 had to be interpreted 
                                                 
50 Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent 
authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15 
  21in accordance with Directive 88/361
51 and that the concept of direct investments 
concerns “investments of any kind undertaken by natural or legal persons and which 
serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the 
capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out 
an economic activity” (para.181).  As regards the holding of shares, direct investment 
means that the shareholder must have the ability to participate effectively in the 
management of that company or in its control.  It must be noted that this is less than 
“definite influence over the company’s decisions” allowing the shareholder “ to 
determine the company’s activities” and operations, which is the test for when a 
shareholding amounts to the exercise of the right of establishment.  Article 57 
grandfathers restrictive measures only inasmuch as they apply to direct investments 
(including investment which amounts to establishment) between EU Member States and 
third countries (para. 185-187)  Thus it seems that to the extent the tax restrictions on 
FMC apply to dividends related to holdings of shares below the direct investment level 
(i.e. “portfolio” shareholdings), Art. 57 is inapplicable so these measures are 
incompatible with Art. 56 (unless justified). 
  
The ECJ held that the fact that the FID system was optional did not necessarily prevent it 
being a new restriction.  The actual determination of whether Art. 57 applied was referred 
back to the national court for resolution in accordance with the principle that post-1993 
measures that do not impose new restrictions or which reduce or eliminate obstacles to 
FMC fall within Art. 57 and may be retained.
52  It appears that the FID system in fact 
reduced the inequality of treatment of inbound dividends in relation to domestic 
dividends, so that it is possible that Art. 57 will apply, at least in respect of dividends 
received on shares in third country companies which amount to direct investment [196].   
 
Following FII Test Claimants, it is now clearly established that if a taxpayer can show 
that the effect of the national tax law is to tax foreign dividends more heavily than 
                                                 
51 Flynn locates the origin of  the phrase in connection with free movement of capital  further back in time 
to Annex II of the First Directive for the implementation of Art. 67, JOCE 1960 P43/921 Series II Chapter 
1959-1962, p. 49 English special addition.  See Flynn, note ___ above, at footnote 5 on p. 776. 
52 Following Case C- 302/97 Konle, note ___ at para 52.  
  22domestic dividends, even if it results in only a cash flow disadvantage and not a heavier 
tax burden at the end of the day, Art. 56 will be infringed. 
  
There is one exceptional recent case on inbound dividends which must not be ignored.  In 
Kerckhaert and Morres v. Belgium
53, the Court held that Belgium’s schedular system, 
subjecting both domestic and foreign dividends received by individuals to a tax of 25% 
without taking into account corporate profits or withholding tax imposed in the Member 
State of residence of the distributing company, did not infringe Art. 56.  The taxpayers 
were Belgian residents who had received dividends from a French company.  They were 
entitled to the French 50% imputation tax credit (or avoir fiscal) so that the total French 
and Belgian tax on the French dividends was less than was payable on Belgian dividends.  
The French tax credit more than offset the effect of the French withholding tax of 15% 
which was applied to the combined dividend and the tax credit.  Thus Belgium did not 
tax French dividends more heavily than Belgian dividends, as both were subject to the 
same 25% Belgian tax, and although Belgium did not provide a tax credit for French 
withholding tax, the French avoir fiscal completely offset the effect of French 
withholding tax, so that no actual tax disadvantage was suffered by the taxpayers.  In this 
sense Kerckhaert-Morres is clearly distinguishable from the trilogy of leading cases, 
Verkooijen, Lenz and Manninen where there was heavier taxation by the taxpayer’s home 
country of foreign source dividends. 
 
The Court could have limited its response to the reference question to a ruling that, in the 
circumstances, there was no actual discrimination or restriction.  However, it chose to 
consider the argument that the Belgian system was discriminatory in that it taxed 
dividends received from another Member State the same as Belgian dividends, when 
dividends received from France were subject to French withholding tax as well as 
Belgian income tax.  In order to avoid the discriminatory treatment claimed the 
taxpayers, Belgium ought to provide a tax credit to compensate for the French 
withholding tax. 
 
                                                 
53 C-513/04 14 November 2006 [2006] ECR I-0000, (Grand Chamber). 
  23This argument would be quite appealing if the Member State in which the company 
paying the dividends was resident provided no tax credit to non-residents, and simply 
applied a 15% withholding tax on dividends paid to non-residents.  This is the normal 
treatment of cross-border dividends under tax treaties based on the OECD Model, and is 
normally combined with the grant of a tax credit (or an exemption) by the recipient’s 
state of residence to mitigate or eliminate the juridical double taxation of the taxpayer on 
the dividend by both States.  The unusual feature in the Belgian system was that no tax 
credit was provided by Belgium for the French withholding tax, possibly because of the 
availability of the French tax credit.  The Belgium-France tax treaty provided for 
Belgium to provide such a tax credit, but Belgium had amended its tax law to remove the 
tax credit entitlement. 
 
The Court ruled that Belgium’s refusal to grant a tax credit was not discriminatory, and 
more significantly, not within the purview of Community law.  It resulted from the 
discretion exercised by Belgium in the parallel operation of two separate national tax 
systems, not from discrimination against inbound dividends within the Belgian tax 
system.  The Court stated that Community law did not require Member States to 
eliminate juridical double taxation, an area of competence left to the Member States 
under Art. 293.
54  The Commission does not accept this aspect of the judgment in 
Kerckhaert-Morres, and has already commenced a new challenge to Belgium’s dividend 
taxation system, now that France has eliminated its avoir fiscal.
55
 
Many Member States have now revised their laws on taxation of inbound dividends 
received by individuals to bring them into conformity with the EC Treaty.  Several 
Member States amended their tax laws either in anticipation of the Verkooijen ruling or 
soon thereafter.
56  The Commission issued a Communication
57 in late 2003 addressing 
                                                 
54 Art. 293 provides so far as relevant:  Member States shall so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations 
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: (…) – the abolition of double 
taxation within the Community. 
55 Commission Press Release IP/07/67, 22 January 2007. 
56 These include Germany, France, UK (1999), Netherlands.  See  Richard J.Vann, General Report, 88A 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2003) and  Ilhi, Malmer, Schonewille and Tuominen EU Report in 
IFA Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International 2003; and the discussion of “The Demise of Imputation” in 
Michael J. Graetz and Alvin C. Warren Jr., (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1186 at pp. 1208-1212. 
  24the issue of dividend taxation of individuals, the first example of Commission guidance 
to Member States on the significance of decisions of the ECJ in tax matters.   
 
Notwithstanding the Communication, there are still some national inbound dividend tax 
measures that are currently the subject of litigation.  In addition to the new infringement 
action against Belgium mentioned above, the Commission has commenced an 
infringement process against Greece
58 and a reference for a preliminary ruling is pending 
regarding differences in Dutch tax relief granted in respect of dividends received by 
certain collective investment funds from Dutch and foreign companies.
59  The latter case 
and another pending case, Holböck v. Finanzamt Salzburg-Land, 
60 discussed below, 
involve dividends received from third countries. 
 
D.  Outbound dividends 
 
The compatibility with Art. 56 of various national tax rules with respect to outbound 
dividends, whether received by individuals or corporations, is much less clear than is the 
case with inbound dividends. Where the inbound dividends cases are concerned with 
different treatment based on where capital is invested, different treatment of outbound 
dividends is a question of different treatment based on residence of the recipient.   
 
As outlined earlier, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive has eliminated withholding taxes 
where the recipient company holds at least 15% of the capital of the distributing 
company, so that the issue does not now arise in respect of dividends flowing within 
corporate groups.  The Commission took the position in its 2003 Communication that a 
Member State could not exempt domestic dividends yet continue to levy a withholding 
                                                                                                                                                 
57 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, “Dividend taxation of individuals in the Internal Market”, COM(2003) 
810 final, Brussels, 19.12.2003. 
58 IP/06/1410 17 October 2006 Direct Taxation: Commission requests Greece to end discriminatory 
treatment of dividends received from foreign companies.  Greece provides a tax exemption for dividends 
received by individuals from Greek companies, but not from foreign companies. 
59 Pending case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund NV OJ C 178 29.07.2006 p. 15. 
60 Pending Case C-157/05, note ___. 
  25tax on outbound dividends.
61  In its view, a comparison of the total tax burden on 
domestic dividends with the effect of the withholding tax on outbound dividends is 
necessary to determine whether the system is compatible with FMC.  
 
The first case on outbound dividends and FMC came from the EFTA Court in late 
2004.
62  Fokus Bank, resident in Norway, withheld tax of 15% on dividends paid to two 
of its shareholders, companies resident in Germany and the UK. Since the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive applies within the EEA, these companies’ shareholding in the 
capital of Fokus Bank would have been below the 25% level at which the Directive 
prohibited withholding tax at the time. A Norwegian resident shareholder was not subject 
to the 15% withholding tax, and received a full imputation tax credit effectively 
exempting the dividend from Norwegian tax by treating a portion of the underlying 
corporate tax paid by Fokus Bank on its profits as having been paid by the Norwegian 
shareholder (similar to the tax credit in Manninen). 
 
Fokus Bank challenged the Norwegian withholding tax as incompatible with Art. 40 of 
the EEA Agreement,
63 which is the functional equivalent of Art. 56 except that it does 
not extend to countries not party to the EEA Agreement.  The Norwegian court referred 
the interpretation of Art. 40 to the EFTA court. 
 
Following the ECJ’s ruling in Ospelt,
64 the EFTA Court held that the rules governing free 
movement of capital in the EEA Agreement are essentially identical in substance to those 
in the EC Treaty and therefore should be interpreted and applied in the same way as Art. 
56 as between EEA countries.   The EFTA Court accordingly treated the distribution and 
receipt of dividends as movements of capital, following Verkooijen.  The different 
                                                 
61 Section 3.3.1, p. 17, note ___. 
62 Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank ASA v. Norwegian State, 23 November 2004 available online at 
http://www.eftacourt.lu/default.asp?layout=article&id=251 . 
63 Art. 40 EEA provides, so far as relevant here: “Within the framework of the provisions of this 
Agreement, there shall be no restrictions between the Contracting Parties on the movement of capital 
belonging to persons resident in EC Member States or EFTA States and no discrimination based on the 
nationality or on the place of residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested.”  The 
EEA comprises the EU Member States plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
64 Note ___. 
  26treatment by Norway of domestic and outbound dividends could deter non-residents from 
investing in Norwegian companies, and make it more difficult for such companies to 
raise capital outside Norway, and so in principle were incompatible with EEA Art. 40. 
 
As to justification, the same approach as under the EC Treaty was applied:  Although tax 
laws may validly distinguish between taxpayers who are not in a comparable situation 
with regard to their residence, a difference in treatment is only compatible with Art. 40 if 
the situations of resident and non-resident are not objectively comparable, or is justified 
by reasons of overriding public interest.  The difference in treatment must be proportional 
to the objective. 
 
The EFTA Court found that the fact that Norwegian residents are subject to Norwegian 
tax on all their income, while non-residents are subject to Norwegian tax only on income 
from Norwegian sources did not prevent their situations being objectively comparable in 
respect of the taxation of dividends (residents of other countries are also taxed on their 
worldwide income).  The Court rejected the argument that outbound dividends are 
different from inbound, and relied on Lenz and Manninen.  Since Norwegian taxpayers 
were protected from economic double taxation by Norwegian law, residents of other EEA 
countries had to be equally protected, so that denying them the imputation tax credit 
infringed Art. 40. 
 
Norway sought to justify the different treatment as necessary to preserve the cohesion of 
the international tax system.  It argued that if the source country is required to provide 
the same tax credit for non-residents as it does for resident shareholders, the effect is to 
eliminate the ability of the source state to tax the profits of resident companies distributed 
to non-residents.  This is inconsistent with the allocation of taxing jurisdiction accepted in 
international tax law, in accordance with which the source country may tax such 
distributions, and it is for the shareholder’s home country to offset the double taxation by 
means of a tax credit or exemption.  The EFTA court held, however, that this would give 
precedence to the terms of bilateral tax treaties (which allocate taxing jurisdiction in this 
way) over the EEA agreement’s guarantee of FMC. 
  27 
Norway also argued that the Court should take into account the tax credits available to 
non-resident shareholders in their home country either by reason of a bilateral tax treaty 
or under the home country’s domestic law in determining whether outbound dividends 
were in fact subject to a greater tax burden than Norwegian domestic dividends.  In 
response, the Court held that the availability of a Norwegian imputation credit for both 
resident and non-resident shareholders on the same basis as required by Art. 40 could not 
be made dependent on whether a tax advantage was provided in the non-resident’s home 
state.  Norway could not rely on the tax rules prevailing in other EEA countries to make 
good its discrimination against non-Norwegian shareholders. 
 
It should be noted that the tax credits (potentially) available to the non-resident dividend 
recipients under the Norway-Germany and Norway-UK tax treaties would not 
compensate for the underlying Norwegian corporation tax paid by Fokus Bank on its 
profits (for which the Norwegian imputation credit available to Norwegian residents did 
compensate).  There was no finding by the court, and it was unclear in the report for the 
hearing, whether either Germany or the UK provided a tax credit for underlying 
Norwegian corporate tax paid by Fokus Bank. 
 
Fokus Bank was a significant new application of FMC.  Norway amended its tax 
legislation in anticipation of the decision to conform with the EEA Agreement.  The 
correctness of some aspects of the ruling is, however, in doubt as three rulings of the ECJ 
in 2006 on outbound dividends have taken a different view as to the applicability of the 
inbound dividends cases, and the relevance of bilateral tax treaty provisions to the issue 
of whether a measure actually results in less favourable treatment of outbound dividends. 
 
The next case on FMC and outbound dividends, Bouanich,
65 concerned the Swedish tax 
provisions applicable on the repurchase by a Swedish company of its shares, and so is 
perhaps not strictly speaking an outbound dividends case.  A Swedish resident was 
subject to tax of 30% of the capital gain realized on the repurchase of the shares.  
                                                 
65 C-265/04 [2006] ECR I-923 19 January 2006. 
  28However, the gross proceeds of the repurchased shares were treated as a dividend when 
paid to a non-resident, on which in principle the non-resident was liable to Swedish 
withholding tax of 30%.  Ms. Bouanich, as a resident of France, was entitled to the 
benefit of the Sweden-France tax treaty, which reduced the rate of tax payable on the 
dividend to 15%, and allowed the deduction of the nominal value (which is often if not 
usually much lower than the acquisition cost) of the shares in calculating the amount of 
the dividend.
66    
 
The Court found that the Swedish tax law constituted a restriction on FMC and could not 
be justified, and indeed the Swedish government conceded the incompatibility between 
the Swedish law and Community law and stated its intention to amend the Swedish rule.  
The ability of Swedish residents to deduct the acquisition cost of the shares in computing 
the capital gain, while non-residents were taxed on the gross repurchase price, was 
clearly different treatment. The Court found that the acquisition cost of the shares was so 
directly linked to the payment of the share repurchase price that residents and non-
residents were in an objectively comparable situation in this regard, so that there was no 
basis on which to justify the different treatment.  
 
The second question was whether the Sweden-France tax treaty fixing the maximum 
Swedish tax rate on the dividend received by French residents at 15%, should be taken 
into account in determining whether there was a restriction on FMC.  Contrary to the 
position taken by the Commission, the Court held that the Swedish law derived from the 
tax treaty and the tax treaty thus formed part of the legal framework to the case, and had 
to be taken into account in determining the correct interpretation of Community law.  
However, it was for the Swedish court to apply Swedish law, including the tax treaty, to 
the particular case and assess whether a non-resident shareholder in a given case was 
subject to less favourable treatment than resident shareholders.   
 
                                                 
66 Ms. Bouanich took the position that only France had the right to tax the transaction, as a capital gain: 
para. 45.  The ECJ did not deal with this argument. 
  29The significance of Bouanich is the Court’s willingness to assess the existence of a 
restriction based on the actual effects of a relevant tax treaty.  This is a clear divergence 
from Fokus Bank, though in the latter case the issue was whether the source state, 
Norway, could invoke the tax treaty’s effect in the state of residence, while in Bouanich it 
was whether the source state could invoke the tax treaty’s effect on the tax levied by the 
source state.   
 
The ECJ (Grand Chamber) issued its ruling in Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT 
Group Litigation (“ACT IV”),
67 on December 12, 2006, the same day it released its ruling 
in FII Test Claimants.    ACT IV also concerned the compatibility of certain aspects of the 
UK’s former ACT system with freedom of establishment and capital were considered, 
but in ACT IV it was the alleged differential treatment of outbound dividends that was at 
issue.   
 
Neither resident nor non-resident corporations receiving dividends from UK resident 
companies were subject to UK tax (whether corporate income tax or withholding tax) on 
the dividends.  As outlined earlier, resident companies had to pay ACT when they 
distributed profits as dividends, whether to UK shareholders or to foreign shareholders, 
but could set the ACT paid in respect of the distribution against their corporate profits tax 
liability for the year, or carry it forward or back to years when it had sufficient corporate 
tax liability to absorb the ACT.   
 
The claimants alleged that the failure by the UK to grant a tax credit to non-resident 
companies for the ACT paid by the UK resident distributing company was incompatible 
with FMC, since resident companies were entitled to a tax credit.  However, the Court 
accepted that resident and non-resident companies receiving dividends from resident 
companies were not necessarily in comparable positions, as the non-resident company is 
not liable to UK corporate tax, or to ACT when it distributes its profits to its 
shareholders.  The source state (UK) is not in a position to mitigate double economic 
taxation of profits in the form of dividends received by the non-resident shareholder, as 
                                                 
67 Case C-374/04, [2006] ECR I-0000. 
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generated on its territory in accordance with international tax norms.  The state of 
residence of the dividend recipient has the obligation to ensure that double economic 
taxation is mitigated (assuming it does the same for domestic dividends).   
 
ACT IV takes a very different approach from Fokus Bank.
68  At para. 59 the Court clearly 
states that the Member State of source is not required to provide a mitigating tax credit to 
non-resident dividend recipients to offset the underlying corporate tax paid by the 
distributing corporation just because it provides such a credit to resident dividend 
recipients.  This, the Court says, would oblige the Member State of source “to abandon its 
right to tax a profit generated through economic activity on its territory”, precisely the 
position unsuccessfully taken by Norway in Fokus Bank .  It also recalls the mirror-image 
position, also unsuccessful, taken by the Netherlands government in Verkooijen, that it 
was entitled to tax corporate profits generated in other Member States when received in 
the form of dividends by Netherlands residents.  The result is clearly different depending 
on whether it is the state of source or the state of residence which invokes its jurisdiction 
to tax the corporate profits. 
 
The distinction between Fokus Bank and ACT IV which may allow the two cases to stand 
together (but for the ruling on the relevance of the tax treaty’s provisions) is that in ACT 
IV there was no withholding tax imposed by the UK on the dividends paid to non-
residents so that there was no economic double taxation of non-resident shareholders by 
the UK.  (In cases where the relevant tax treaty allowed withholding tax, there was an 
offsetting entitlement to an ACT credit.)  In Fokus Bank, Norway claimed a 15% 
withholding tax from the recipient shareholder (effectively imposing economic double 
taxation on Fokus Bank’s profits in its hands and in the hands of its non-resident 
                                                 
68 The Advocate General (Geelhoed)  in ACT IV expressly stated that the EFTA had erred in Fokus Bank  in 
footnote 83 of the Opinion, 23 February 2006 based on his reasoning at paras. 69-71.  He forcefully stated 
that the source state is only responsible to equalize taxation of domestic and outbound dividends to the 
extent it applies its tax jurisdiction to the dividend in the hands of the recipient – i.e. only in respect of the 
15% withholding tax in Fokus Bank.  It may achieve equality of taxation through the effects of a tax treaty, 
but it is no defence for the source state to say that the residence state failed to live up to its tax treaty 
obligations.  The Court generally followed the AG’s recommendations in its responses to the reference 
questions, but did not refer to Fokus Bank or expressly adopt the AG’s reasoning. 
  31shareholders), but did not allow an offsetting credit as it did for resident shareholders.  It 
may be that had Norway not imposed the withholding tax (so that the situation would 
parallel the UK situation in ACT IV), or the EFTA Court had allowed the tax credits 
available in the home States to be taken into account, there would have been no unequal 
treatment by Norway of resident and non-resident shareholders.   
 
The last case to be discussed here, Denkavit Internationaal,
69 was based on freedom of 
establishment.  However, because the facts in Denkavit pre-date the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, and so concern the legality of the taxation of dividends by Member States in 
the absence of EU harmonization measures, it may turn out to be more significant in the 
context of FMC.
70  
 
Denkavit Internationaal BV, a Dutch parent company, held, directly or indirectly all the 
shares of its two French subsidiaries.  The French Code Général des Impôts imposed a 
25% withholding tax on dividends paid by French companies to non-resident 
shareholders. The withholding tax rate was reduced to 5% under the France-Netherlands 
tax treaty where the recipient Netherlands company held at least 25% of the capital of the 
French company.  No withholding tax was imposed on dividends paid to French 
residents, or permanent establishments (PEs) in France of foreign companies, so such 
residents and PEs of foreign companies were effectively exempt on dividends received 
from French companies. 
 
Despite a provision of the France-Netherlands tax treaty under which the Netherlands 
was to provide a tax credit for the French withholding tax against the recipient’s 
Netherlands tax liability, the Netherlands instead provided an exemption for the 
dividends.  In the result, the French dividends paid to the Netherlands parent company 
bore more French tax, and more tax overall, due entirely to the uncredited withholding 
tax, than dividends paid to French residents or permanent establishments in France of 
foreign corporations.  
                                                 
69 C-170/05 14 December 2006 (First Chamber). 
70 Jerome Delauriere, “Does Denkavit signal the end of withholding tax?”, 45 Tax Notes Int’l 303 (January 
29, 2007)] 
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The Court found that French resident parent companies were treated differently from 
non-resident parent companies in that residents were almost entirely exempt of tax on 
dividends while non-resident parent companies were subject to the 5% withholding tax. 
There was no relevant objective difference in the situations that would make the different 
treatment non-discriminatory, since it was based solely on the location of the parent’s 
registered office.  Relying on ACT IV, the Court said that once a Member State imposes a 
tax on both resident and non-resident shareholders in respect of dividends received from 
a resident company, the situation of the non-resident shareholders becomes comparable to 
the situation of resident shareholders. The exemption for resident parent companies was 
designed to eliminate economic double taxation; since France had chosen to relieve its 
resident companies’ profits of a series of tax charges (i.e. economic double taxation), it 
must extend that relief to non-residents to the extent to which such double taxation results 
from exercise of its tax jurisdiction. 
 
The effect of the France-Netherlands tax treaty providing for a compensating tax credit 
was then addressed.  Since the tax treaty formed part of the applicable law, the Court took 
its provisions into account, following Bouanich and ACT IV.  However, since the credit 
was only available to the extent of the Netherlands tax paid on the dividends, and the 
dividends were exempt under Dutch domestic law, the credit did not in fact reduce the 
total tax payable by the Netherlands parent company to the same level as the (usually nil) 
tax payable by a French parent company. 
 
France argued that it was for the Netherlands, as the State of residence of the parent 
company, to ensure that there was no (economic) double taxation.  The Court referred 
back to its first direct taxation decision
71 for support for the proposition that France as the 
source State could not rely on a bilateral convention to avoid its obligations under the EC 
Treaty.  This is remarkably similar to the statement in Fokus Bank, and seems to suggest 
that the tax treaty is not to be taken into account in assessing the impact of the French 
                                                 
71 Case 270/83 Commission v. France para 26.  This case stands for the proposition that a Member State 
whose domestic legislation is incompatible with a fundamental freedom cannot rely on a tax treaty to 
justify it.  The tax treaty may not override the supremacy of EU law. 
  33dividend tax regime.  However, it is clear from the judgment that it is the actual effect of 
Dutch law, including the tax treaty, on the tax burden borne by the outbound dividends 
that is relevant.  If the tax treaty does not in fact mitigate the double taxation by the 
source country, then the source country still bears the obligation of ensuring that there is 
no disadvantageous treatment of outbound dividends by comparison with domestic 
dividends. 
 
The Denkavit situation appears to have arisen anew with respect to Netherlands dividend 
withholding tax rules, which have been referred to the ECJ in Amurta S.G.P.S.
72  The 
issue is whether the exemption from dividend withholding tax available only to 
shareholders liable to corporate tax in the Netherlands or to permanent establishments of 
foreign corporations to which the shareholding is effectively connected is a restriction on 
FMC, since foreign corporations are not entitled to the exemption.  The Commission has 
recently referred Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Latvia
73 to the ECJ 
alleging that their outbound dividend tax laws infringe both FMC and freedom of 
establishment, relying on the Denkavit judgment. 
 
The outbound dividends cases, few and recent as they are, together result in a coherent, if 
incomplete, jurisprudence similar to the inbound dividends cases.  One looks first to the 
source country’s tax system, and whether it treats domestic and outbound dividends the 
same.  If yes, there is no restriction: ACT IV.  If there is a difference in treatment, one 
considers the relevant tax treaty to the extent it limits the source country’s jurisdiction to 
tax the outbound dividend: Bouanich.  The issue of whether the tax treaty in fact 
equalizes the source State tax burden on domestic and outbound dividends will normally 
be referred back to the national court for determination.   
 
If an applicable tax treaty requires the home State of the recipient of the dividends to 
compensate for withholding tax imposed by the source State, (the element of economic 
double taxation of corporate profits/dividends by the source State), and the home State in 
                                                 
72 Pending case C-379/05. 
73 Commission Press Release IP/07/66 22 January 2007.  The infringement action against Luxembourg was 
not referred to the ECJ as the country changed its law in response to the Commission’s reasoned opinion. 
  34fact does so, it is likely, based on Denkavit that the Court would find that the withholding 
tax imposed by the source State is not a restriction.   
 
Denkavit follows Fokus Bank (and is consistent with ACT IV) to the extent it holds that a 
source State tax system that imposes economic double taxation on “outbound” corporate 
profits in the form of a dividend withholding tax, but mitigates it in respect of domestic 
corporate profits distributed to domestic shareholders, is incompatible with Art. 56.  In 
both cases the system fully prevented economic double taxation in respect of corporate 
profits within the domestic sphere by providing a credit to the dividend recipient to offset 
the corporate tax.  Accordingly, corporate profits were taxed once only by the source 
State, but outbound dividends were taxed twice by the source State. 
 
III.  The Third Country Dimension of FMC 
 
The significance of the interpretation and application to be given to the third country 
dimension of FMC is obvious in respect of both inbound and outbound dividends.  
Although many EU Member States have revised their tax regimes for taxing inbound 
dividends since 1993 to remove any discrimination regardless of where the distributing 
company is resident, there are undoubtedly some situations where the amendments have 
been made only in respect of EEA source dividends.  EU resident investors in Canadian 
companies whose ownership of shares does not amount to control may be able to assert 
claims based on the principles in Manninen and FII Test Claimants that dividends 
received from a Canadian company must receive the same advantageous treatment as 
domestic dividends.  If the EU Member State provides a an exemption, special rate or 
imputation credit to the dividend recipient in respect of domestic and EU/EEA dividends 
profits, it would have to provide the same relief in respect of Canadian source dividends.  
 
The same is true in the case of outbound dividends.  By way of example, a Canadian 
company holding less than a controlling stake in a company resident in an EU Member 
State will be subject to withholding tax of 5% to 15% imposed by the source State on the 
  35dividends under most of Canada’s tax treaties with EU Member States.
74  Canada will 
exempt the dividends from Canadian taxation if it is derived from active business activity 
by the distributing company in the source country, so that there will be no Canadian tax 
against which to credit the withholding tax.  If the source country exempts domestic 
dividends, the conditions for Denkavit to apply are present, and the Canadian company 
can presumably recover the withholding tax by action in the national court of the source 
State.   
 
There are three main issues in respect of the application of Articles 56-58 to third country 
movements of capital.  The first is the problem of overlapping freedoms.  If two or more 
fundamental freedoms are restricted by an EU Member State’s tax measure, one of which 
is FMC, in what circumstances will the Court base its ruling on FMC and not the other 
freedom?  The second issue is the scope and application of Art. 57, the grandfather or 
standstill provision.  The third is the issue of justifications for restrictions, whether as 
expressly recognized in Article 58 or under the doctrine of overriding reasons in the 
general interest, and more particularly, whether the justifications available in respect of 
third country capital movements are more extensive than in intra-EU situations. 
 
A.  Overlap with other fundamental freedoms 
 
One issue that has not been definitively resolved arises where a given national law is 
capable of infringing more than one fundamental freedom.  There are many situations in 
which a measure impacts both capital and services, or capital and establishment, and 
even, such as the case of taxation of pension contributions and benefits, all four: workers, 
establishment, services and capital.
75  Since the legal principles governing the 
fundamental freedoms have by and large converged, both as to what constitutes a 
restriction and what justifications are accepted, the practical outcome for the taxpayer (or 
                                                 
74 Canada does not have a tax treaty with Greece, so that the withholding rate is 25% on dividends paid by 
Canadian companies to Greek recipients. 
75 In the recent case on Denmark’s pension taxation rules, the Commission put forward free movement of 
workers, services, capital and the right of establishment and the Art. 18 right of EU citizens to move and 
reside freely throughout the EU: Commission v. Denmark C-150/04 30 January 2007 (Grand Chamber).  
The Court ruled that it was not necessary to consider FMC since the Danish tax measures were 
incompatible with all the other Treaty freedoms which were put forward. 
  36the Member State or Commission) is not usually a function of which freedom was relied 
on, at least in intra-EU cases. 
 
Since FMC is the only fundamental freedom that extends beyond the EU to third 
countries, it is critical that the alleged restriction fall under Art. 56 in order for the 
taxpayer to have a basis on which to challenge a tax measure’s compatibility with the EC 
Treaty.  Although there are many judgments and opinions on the criteria for determining 
which fundamental freedom is to be applied, there is a degree of uncertainty still 
prevailing on this issue generally.  In respect of FMC and dividends, the actual test 
claimants in FII Test Claimants reference were UK parent companies which held directly 
or indirectly 100% of the capital of subsidiaries in other EU Member States, EEA 
countries and third countries.  The Court at paragraph 37
76 stated that freedom of 
establishment would apply wherever the recipient company exercised definite influence 
over the decisions and activities of the distributing company.  Since the wider group of 
claimants could include UK companies which did not control the foreign distributing 
company, the Court considered that Art. 56 would apply in those situations (paragraph 
38).  The implication of these statements is that FMC will only apply where the 
relationship does not amount to actual control of one company by the other (or by an 
individual),
77 so that FMC will not be available in third country situations where there is 
control, because these fall under freedom of establishment, which does not apply outside 
the EU/EEA. 
 
The pending Holböck
78 case is a challenge to Austria’s inbound dividend rules by an 
Austrian resident who held two-thirds of the capital of a Swiss company.  It will directly 
raise the issue of whether Art. 56 can be relied on in a third country situation when 
freedom of establishment would apply to an intra-EU situation.  The argument would be 
that the list of capital movements in Directive 88/361 include direct investments 
amounting to establishment (and the grandfathering of measures pertaining to such direct 
                                                 
76 The court cited Baars, Cadbury Schweppes and X and Y.[review bases of these decisions] 
77 In Case C-251/98 [2000] ECR I-2787, Baars, the Netherlands resident individual taxpayer held all of the 
shares of an Irish company, and this was considered to be a matter for freedom of establishment, and it was 
“not necessary” to apply free movement of capital. 
78 See note [15]. 
  37investments in Art. 57 reinforces the point.)  It would, therefore, be an unwarranted 
restriction of the application of Art. 56 to third countries to exclude capital movements 
that are not protected by freedom of establishment.  Further, it might be argued that it 
undermines the purpose of supporting Art. 56 of supporting the single currency and 
liberating capital flows globally to the furthest extent possible. 
 
This issue was recently addressed in the context of the overlap of services and capital in 
Fidium Finanz.
79  This case was not a tax case; it concerned German legislation that 
required financial services providers to obtain official authorization to offer financial 
services to German residents unless they were established in an EU or EEA Member 
State.  Fidium was a Swiss enterprise offering short term consumer loans via internet to 
German residents.  It was not required by Switzerland to obtain any authorization to 
operate because it did not offer financial services in Switzerland.  It challenged the 
German law on the basis that it was a restriction on FMC with a third country. 
 
The Court found that while the German measure concerned both services and capital, the 
substance of the restriction was the freedom to provide services without being established 
in Germany, a Treaty freedom which does not extend to third countries.  The measure 
was primarily and directly a restriction on access to the financial services market, and the 
obstacle to FMC was merely an inevitable and indirect consequence of the restriction on 
services.  Thus it was “not necessary” to consider the application of Art. 56.  The Court 
cited its decision in Cadbury-Schweppes,
80 a direct tax case where the allegedly 
restrictive tax measures only applied as between UK resident companies and controlled 
subsidiaries, that is, in respect of establishment though both establishment and capital 
were relied on. 
 
The Fidium Finanz ruling would seem to exclude the application of Art. 56 even where 
no other Treaty freedom applies, and not only where two or more could apply (since only 
FMC applies in third country cases), but one is more directly applicable.  The logic of 
                                                 
79 C-452/04 3 October 2006 [2006] ECR I-0000. (Grand Chamber) 
80 Case C-196/04 12 September 2006, [2006] ECR I-0000. 
  38denying recourse to Art. 56 by third country claimants on the basis that the circumstances 
are more directly concerned with a freedom to which they have no access is somewhat 
questionable.  In her Opinion in the case, the Advocate General carefully examined the 
regulatory situation in Switzerland and the ability of the German authorities to ensure 
appropriate supervision of lenders’ activities involving German borrowers and to obtain 
necessary information from Swiss authorities regarding Fidium Finanz.  She concluded 
that in all the circumstances the requirement of official authorization was justified and 
proportional.  This approach seems more reasonable and logical, particularly where the 
issue, as in the direct tax cases, is not purely a restriction on access to markets in the EU, 
but differential tax treatment of capital flows.  
 
Investment amounting to establishment is expressly included in the list of capital 
movements in Directive 88/361, and to simply hold that it is “not necessary” to consider 
FMC in a third country case where the capital movement takes the form of direct 
investment amounting to establishment would be a very sharp curtailing of the third 
country dimension.  Furthermore, the specific permission provided to Member States in 
Art. 57.1  to maintain in force measures which restrict direct investment which amounts 
to establishment in respect of third countries would be meaningless if Art. 56 was never 
to apply where the investment in connection with which the movement of capital 
occurred amounted to establishment.   One could argue that it is only where the restrictive 
measure has to do directly and primarily with the exercise of the right of establishment, 
and a movement of capital is only indirectly and unavoidably connected with that 
exercise, that recourse to Art. 56 should be excluded in third country cases.  This would 
be consistent with the services-capital ruling in Fidium Finanz.  Such an approach would 
arguably not preclude application of Art. 56 in dividend taxation cases, even where the 
recipient company controlled the distributing company, if it can be asserted that the 
taxation of dividends is not a question of market access, but discriminatory treatment of 
capital movements, and the level of share ownership or control is not directly at issue.  
This would mean that the freedom that is most directly and primarily affected is capital, 
not establishment. 
 
  39The Court has now taken a similar stance to its ruling in Fidium Finance in a direct tax 
case, though not with respect to dividends.  In its judgment in Test Claimants in the Thin 
Cap Group Litigation
81 the Court excluded examination of compatibility of a measure 
with Art. 56 where the scope of the impugned tax measure is restricted to groups of 
companies, in third country cases as well as where the taxpayer also relies on freedom of 
establishment.  This case concerned the UK tax treatment of interest paid by a UK 
company to its parent company or a lender within the related company group, whether in 
an EU Member State or a third country, and clearly excluded the application of Art. 56 
where the parent company was resident in a third country, on the basis that freedom of 
establishment was primarily and directly concerned.  The likelihood that the Court will 
treat dividends differently seems small, unless the Court can be persuaded that dividends 
pertain most directly to capital movements, regardless of the level of ownership of shares 
in the distributing company.   
 
B.  Article 57 
 
As noted above, the actual determination in a reference for a preliminary ruling of 
whether a post-1993 national measure is grandfathered by Art. 57.1 is usually referred 
back to the national court for determination in accordance with the responses given by the 
ECJ to the referred questions.  The UK High Court’s conclusions on whether the FID 
provisions of 1994 are grandfathered by Art. 57.1 will be very illuminating.   
 
If it now seems that the Court will conclude that dividends paid by controlled subsidiary 
to parent company are not governed by Art. 56 but by the right of establishment, it is 
clear that dividends paid and received in respect of portfolio investments in shares cannot 
be grandfathered by Art. 57.1.  Between direct investment amounting to establishment 
and portfolio investment likes the middle ground of direct investment.   
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Netherlands.
82  Direct investment was defined as the “form of participation in an 
undertaking through the holding of shares which confers the possibility of effectively 
participating in its management and control”, while portfolio investment refers to “the 
acquisition of shares on the capital market solely with the intention of making a financial 
investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the 
undertaking.”  The side of this line on which any particular investment falls will 
undoubtedly be the subject of future references. 
 
As Member States have adjusted their dividend taxation measures in the wake, or in 
anticipation of challenges, a useful exercise will be to analyze which ones have changed 
their rules to eliminate incompatibility with Art. 56 in third country cases as well as in 
respect of other EU and EEA Member States.  There are undoubtedly some Member 
States that have not removed tax restrictions on dividends. Although taxation rules 
pertaining to dividends flowing only from portfolio investments are clearly both 
governed by Art. 56 and not subject to grandfathering under Art. 57,  the level of EU-
third country portfolio investment, the dividends flowing from such investments, and  the 
amount of tax revenue which could be subject to challenge are obviously significant.  The 
impact of Art. 56 will therefore undoubtedly be of some consequence in the international 
tax and investment world.  At the very least, the EU cases on dividend taxation must raise 
the possibility of new norms being adopted internationally, whether within the OECD or 
in bilateral relations with major trade and investment partners of individual EU countries.  
It would certainly be in the interests of EU Member States to seek to achieve reciprocity 
bilaterally or globally than to find themselves constrained to offer more favourable tax 
treatment to investors and investment in third countries unilaterally. 
 
C.  Justifications 
 
                                                 
82 Joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04, 28 September 2006, [2006] ECR I-0000, at para.19.  See also the 
definition accepted in FII Test Claimants at para. 181, quoted at page ___ above. 
  41FII Test Claimants indicates that the Court accepts that the same fundamental principles 
apply in third country situations as in intra-EU situations when determining whether a 
measure amounts to a restriction on FMC (paras. 164-168), although the issue of whether 
situations are objectively comparable when third country capital movements are 
concerned may involved different considerations.  In particular, the existence of 
harmonizing measures such as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive may lead to the 
conclusion that two situations of taxpayers or investments within the EU are objectively 
comparable, while two situations, one within the EU and one in a third country, are not 
comparable.   In the usual reasoning sequence of the analysis, this would mean that no 
restriction will be found to exist.   
 
It is equally clear from paragraph 171 of FII Test Claimants that the Court is open to new 
justifications being put forward by Member States when the restriction affects third 
country capital movements.  The justifications that have been accepted in intra-EU cases 
will undoubtedly be available to Member States defending tax measures from third 
country challenges.  These include measures that ensure the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision,
83 that are designed to maintain a Member State’s fiscal coherence,
84 reflect 
the principle of territoriality including the preservation of a balanced allocation of taxing 
power between Member States
85 (and presumably between a Member State and a third 
country), or are necessary to prevent tax evasion or avoidance.
86  The measure must also 
meet the standard of proportionality – that it be appropriate to achieve its purpose, and 
restrict no more than necessary the exercise of a fundamental freedom. 
 
The justifications of ensuring the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and prevention of tax 
evasion and avoidance will likely be relied on most often in third country cases.  The ECJ 
often rejects the former justification by referring to the extensive provisions for exchange 
of direct tax information between Member States in the Mutual Assistance Directive.
87  It 
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  42seems to take the position that the existence of this directive is sufficient to overcome all 
compliance information difficulties among Member States.  For third States, there is no 
equivalent multilateral instrument, although there are other mechanisms for sharing of tax 
information, including the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters, sponsored by the Council of Europe and the OECD.  Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden have signed this Convention, as well as a 
number of non-EU Member States including Canada.  Some tax treaties between EU 
Member States and third countries also contain broad provisions for exchange of tax 
information, and even mutual assistance in tax collection.  However, the Mutual 
Assistance Directive is much more far-reaching and as a “domestic” EU measure, may 
carry more weight because it has direct effect and the Court is the ultimate interpreter of 
it.  It can therefore be anticipated that the existence of the Mutual Assistance Directive 
may be cited by the Court as a distinction between intra-EU and third state circumstances 
which can support  a Member State’s more stringent requirements for disclosure and 
proof of facts and even differential tax treatment, when this would not constitute a 
justification for a similar restriction on capital movements between EU Member States.   
 
Membership in the OECD, and its Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements
88 may 
also prove relevant in determining whether a restriction is justified in respect of a 
particular third country.  Clearly, the potential for tax evasion and the impossibility of 
obtaining disclosure of financial information from a particular third country will affect 
the ECJ’s view of the proportionality of a given measure.   
 
It is possible that the Court will take inspiration from other jurisprudence developed by it 
which allows different interpretations in different contexts.  For example, the well-
established case law of the ECJ on the lack of direct effect of WTO Agreements within 
the EU is an example of the Court citing lack of reciprocity as a basis for giving different 
legal effect to different types of provision within the EU legal order.
89
                                                 
88 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, (Paris: OECD, 2006). 
89 ECJ 23 November 1999, C-149/96, Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395, and among others, ECJ 1 
March 2005, C-377/02 Léon van Parys NV v. Belgian Intervention and Refund Board (BIRB)[2003] ECR I-
10497 and ECJ 30 September 2003, C-93/02 P Biret International v Council [2003] ECR I-10497. 
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Quite specifically, the ECJ may allow the justification, always unsuccessful in intra-EU 
case, of preventing erosion of the national tax base or diminution of government 
revenues.  In FII Test Claimants, this argument, made in the abstract, was dismissed by 
Advocate General Geelhoed, but not rejected as untenable in all circumstances.  The high 
degree of economic integration among EU Member States, and the quasi-federal 
character of its common budget and structural funds re-distribution program could 
support a different level of protection for Member State tax bases in relation to third 
countries’ tax equality claims. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
The third country dimension of FMC is still unknown territory, with only limited 
indications from the Advocates General and the ECJ of how this emerging issue will 
evolve in the EU legal order.  While many of the non-tax types of restriction may easily 
apply in the case of third countries (one can imagine a golden share challenge from a 
third country company that would like to make a substantial investment in an EU 
privatized former public monopoly) the tax cases raise more subtle issues of what 
constitutes discrimination, or restriction, in the context of an existing set of international 
tax norms observed by most EU Member States and their largest trading partners within 
the OECD.  The dividend taxation cases are the most evolved of the direct tax – FMC 
cases, and so perhaps are the best indication of the ECJ’s likely approach as it takes on 
the role of the first international tax court.  The next year or two will likely be decisive in 
this evolution from a jurisprudential perspective, but the policy adaptations will continue 
for some time after the case law lays down the most significant strokes of clarity.   
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